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Mr. Henry Shavell  
Advisory Committee on Export Policy

April 25, 1957  
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John P. Hebrew, Agent in Charge  
BFC Investigation Staff

Intelligence Requirement - Soviet Bloc Procurement Agency,  
Organisational Charts and Related Information

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As you were recently informed by our [REDACTED] we have been attempting, since the October 1956 revolution in Hungary, to interrogate, directly or through other U.S. investigative-intelligence organizations, those Hungarian escapees who formerly were concerned with purchases of U.S. and other Western-origin security goods for their governments. We are, of course, similarly interested in defectors of this type from other Sovbloc nations.

We know that it is frequently the added duty of such Sovbloc governmental personnel to travel throughout the Free World in contacting and instructing firms which they may use as covers in securing strategic goods in contravention of the export controls of the United States and other nations friendly to the United States.

In setting up the Hungarian project, it was discovered that much information on the various purchasing groups of the Hungarian Ministry of Commerce (e.g. Metalimpex, Nikex, etc.), as well as on the personalities working there, was available in the form of numerous raw and mostly unevaluated reports. It was necessary that we spend considerable time in extracting the pertinent information from the hundreds of reports available before we could proceed.

Since one of our permanent targets will be these Soviet Bloc purchasing agencies and the activities of the personnel involved therein, it is requested that you discuss with your contacts in EDIC the need of the Washington export control community for finished, up-to-date intelligence in this respect, to include organizational charts describing and identifying the persons engaged in the various offices. In addition, regular information with regard to the trips these individuals make to Western cities, the firms with which they establish contact, and the instructions which they give to such cover firms, would also be a continuing requirement.

This would place us in ready position to know something about the political leanings of these people, to understand their work and the organizations by which they are employed should they, at any time, defect or contact us, the Economic Defense officers in the field, or officials of other U.S. agencies. It would also enable us to study methods and techniques employed and policies adhered to by our direct adversaries in the Economic Defense field and would, it is hoped, in a number of instances, enable us to take steps to prevent the diversion of U.S.-origin security goods to the Soviet Bloc.

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